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Dr Alexander Titov, Queen’s University Belfast  
 
This is Russia's first military engagement outside of the former Soviet Union, but Moscow’s links 
with the Middle East and Syria have deep roots. Soviet involvement in the Middle East started in 
earnest in the mid-1950s. The background was the process of decolonization after WWII, with some 
25 new states emerging in 1957-62 alone. The Soviet Union offered an alternative model of 
modernisation: anti-Western but progressive. This made the USSR a popular power in the developing 
world - in contrast to Eastern Europe where it was imposing its own version of colonialism.   
 
The degree of Soviet influence is, however, debatable as the Middle Eastern states often used 
superpower rivalries to their own advantage, sometime switching their allegiance. For example, Egypt 
under Nasser was the main recipient of the Soviet military and economic aid in the 1950s and 1960s. 
However, it radically changed its foreign policy orientation under his successor Sadat, culminating in 
the Camp David accords of 1979, when Egypt becoming the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty 
with Israel. 
 
After Egypt’s defection to the US, Syria and Iraq remained the USSR’s most important clients in the 
Middle East, a situation maintained in Syria to the present. This included supplies of weapons, 
training of the officer corps, and economic aid. Around 70% of Syrian arms have come from Russia, 
while by the mid-2000s around 10,000 Syrian officers had been trained at Russian military academies, 
and hundreds of Russian advisers had been serving with the Syrian army even before 2011. Such 
close military relations clearly facilitate the ease and effectiveness of the latest Russian intervention 
on the side of the Assad regime, although this is by no means the main reason behind it. 
 
Russia also views Western involvement in the Middle East as a destabilising factor (for example, the 
Iraq war in 2003 and Libya in 2010), based on misguided projection of Western values around the 
world. The West, on the other hand, blames Russia for supporting regimes that have lost their moral 
legitimacy. The Middle East is also important for Russia because it is at the centre of world politics. 
By engaging as a central player in Syria, the Kremlin has changed its status from regional to world 
power. 
 
The longing for recognition as an equal power by the West has been the driving motive of Russian 
foreign policy for most of its history. This became particularly acute after the collapse of the USSR in 
1991, with its sudden change from being one of two superpowers to becoming an ordinary state. Even 
Boris Yeltsin's period, when Russia was at its weakest, saw attempts to confirm its special status with 
the West. Lacking other means to assert itself, Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria display in a 
modern guise Alexander III’s famous phrase that ‘Russia has only two allies - its army and its navy’. 
 
So a general pattern is discernible in Russia: a failed attempt at reform (Westernisation or 
liberalisation) is usually followed by a period of reaction which sees a revival of a strong anti-Western 
sentiment. The failure of Perestroika in the 1980s, and of democratisation in the 1990s, made Putin’s 
anti-Westernism seem almost inevitable. The question is how long this period of reaction will last 
before a new cycle of reform begins again. 
 
